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The EU Commission has recently proposed a new directive establishing a 
framework for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading within the European 
Union. The idea is to devalue the emission quotas in circulation by the year 
2012 at latest, so that the EU will meet its Kyoto target level of an 8% GHG 
reduction. Our main question is whether the final choice of allocation rule can 
be explained by potential industrial net winners involved in the policy making 
process. We answer this question by using rent-seeking theory and by analysing 
the Green Paper hearing replies from the main industrial groups. In other words, 
we want to explain and observe how rent-seeking (or lobbyism) affects the de-
sign of environmental regulation and energy policy in favour of well-organized 
industrial interest groups. We argue that some firms are likely to reap a net gain 
from being regulated by a grandfathered emission trading system. This is so be-
cause total costs of emission reduction and lobbyism are likely to be smaller 
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The EU Commission has recently proposed a new directive establishing a 
framework for greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union 
(CEU, 2001). The proposal for a Greenhouse Gas (GHG) directive is the out-
come of a policy process started by the EU Commission in March 2000 with the 
Green Paper on greenhouse emissions trading within the European Union 
(CEU, 2000). The idea of permit trading is known from the United States, see 
Svendsen and Christensen (1999), Svendsen (1998) and Varming et al. (2000). 
Based on this experience, the directive aims to devalue the emission quotas in 
circulation by the year 2012 at latest, so that the EU will meet its Kyoto target 
level of an 8% GHG reduction, see Brandt and Svendsen (2002). 
 
Both the Green Paper and the new directive proposal are extremely complex 
and detailed. However, our focus on the allocation rule of grandfathering allows 
us to simplify the empirical evidence and limit our analysis to the issues that 
stakeholders made concerning this point only. The main industrial groups men-
tioned in the Green Paper all had the opportunity to comment on the Green Pa-
per. They are the electricity and heat sector, the iron and steel sector, refining, 
chemicals, building materials (glass/pottery/cement) and paper/pulp/printing. 
We limit ourselves to these industrial lobbies, as they are, by far, the most in-
fluential, see Markussen et al. (2002). 
 
Thus, the main question this paper seeks to answer is: Can the final choice of 
allocation rule be explained by potential industrial net winners involved in the 
policy making process? 
 
In other words, we want to explain and observe how rent-seeking (or lobbyism) 
affects environmental regulation in favour of well-organized industrial interest 
groups. In the literature, Hahn and Stavins (1992) and Cropper and Oates 
(1992) have pointed to the need for directing environmental economic research 
towards political reality. Dijkstra (1999), Wallart (1999) and Svendsen (1998; 
1999) have tried to fill this gap by arguing that one major difficulty when putting 
 
7 theory into practice is the absence of political acceptability of environmental taxes 
within producer communities. 
 
Political reality implies that policy makers are confronted by special interest 
groups that pursue private goals which may conflict with the overall goals of 
society. So, if the dominant interest groups do not like a particular proposal, 
they may block it and policy makers will not succeed in achieving the desired 
environmental target levels. This means, in contrast to traditional economic 
theory that the institutional set-up in society must be taken into account. Eco-
nomic theory has traditionally been ‘institution free’ as it does not explicitly 
refer to any state. The government is just there to correct market failures (Muel-
ler, 1989). However, under the strong influence of interest groups, government 
intervention may, in reality, prove worse than the disease of market failure it 
was meant to cure. 
 
Still, as we will argue, rent seeking is not necessarily negative when it facili-
tates the regulation and achievement of specific environmental targets. Our con-
tribution is to analyse the lobbyism that has taken place during the design of the 
forthcoming Greenhouse gas (GHG) market in the EU. Such an analysis has, to 
the best of our knowledge, not yet been undertaken and we proceed as follows. 
First, Section 2 explains the concept of rent-seeking and its welfare consequences, 
which leads to our theoretical discussion of rents created by grandfathering and 
permit trade in Section 3 and our empirical evidence concerning the political po-
sitions of the dominant industrial interest groups (as listed in the Green Paper) 
in relation to allocation rule in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Rent-seeking  and  grandfathering 
2.1 Rent-seeking 
Tullock (1967) first introduced the concept of rent seeking and later defined it 
as the use of resources in lobbying and other activities directed at securing pro-
tective legislation (McKenzie and Tullock, 1981), see also Fishback et al. 
 
8 (2000). In other words, ‘rent’ is not used in its everyday meaning, as the pay-
ment for using a good one does not own. Rather, it means the economic rent 
created by government intervention in the market economy. 
 
These rents are generated when a license/permit system restricts the level of 
economic activity to below what it would be in the absence of such system. 
This gives positive rents to holders of permits, such as holders of CO2 permits. 
Because such licenses and permits have no alternative uses, they only have 
value to their holders; thus, this value is the rent. 
 
Typically, governments create rents by issuing permits to local producers or by 
taxing imports. In the case of the EU, let us first look at the traditional case of 
welfare effects and favored firms within the EU compared to outsiders, before 
turning to the specific case of grandfathering and how existing firms are fa-
vored compared to future firms. 
2.2 Welfare  effects 
The EU common market has most prominently led to the disputed Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Also, the EU has introduced import quotas on, e.g., 
bananas (permits) and has taxed imports of sugar. For these reasons, EU prices 
on agricultural products, bananas and sugar are far above world market prices. 
Figure 1 shows why. 
 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) showed that the loss from distorting policies is 
not confined to the dead-weight loss when resources are shifted into or out of 
affected activity. Two other types of costs must be added to the dead-weight 
loss. First, a person or group affected by the policy may engage in lobbying ef-
forts to block or advance it. Second, a person or group may also engage directly 
in politics to get access to decision-making power. Overall, the State is seen to 
be pushed and pulled by lobbies and interest groups that are more interested in 
redistribution than overall economic growth in society. In this way, resources 
are directed from production to ‘rent-seeking’. 
 
9 Figure 1:  Welfare effects of an import quota and the rents that accrue to 
















Source: Based on Meier and Rauch (2000, p.435) and Svendsen (2003). 
 
In Figure 1, Sd is domestic supply whereas Dd is domestic demand. We assume 
that the EU does not affect the world price within the production range we fo-




In the absence of international trade, the market will clear at the price of Pd. 
With free international trade, the market will clear at the price Pw. The EU 
gains from free international trade can easily be measured as the increase in 
consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is the area below the D-curve and above 
the market price in question because EU consumers are willing to pay a higher 
price than the equilibrium price for the first units (as expressed by their Dd-
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1  This might not be a realistic assumption, but even if EU could affect the world marked price, it 
would not change the arguments put forward, but complicate matters unnecessarily. curve). Before free international trade at price Pd, consumers’ surplus amount 
to area E. After free international trade is introduced, the new S curve is flat fol-
lowing the world market price, Pw. Thus, consumers gain in consumers’ sur-
plus corresponds to the area A + B + C + D + F + G.
2 
 
While the consumers gain from free trade, the domestic producers lose. Pro-
ducer surplus is the area to the left of the S-curve and below the market price in 
question because producers can produce the first units at a lower cost than the 
equilibrium price (as expressed by their Sd-curve). Figure 1 illustrates that at 
the world market price, Pw, only area H is left in producer surplus. Following 
free trade, domestic producers have suffered a loss in producer surplus amount-
ing to areas G + F. 
 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) were first in showing that the loss from a distort-
ing policy is not confined to the dead-weight loss when resources are shifted 
into or out of affected activity. Two other types of costs must be added to the 
dead-weight loss. Firstly, a person or group affected by the policy may engage 
in lobbying efforts to block or advance. Secondly; a person or group may also 
engage directly in politics to get access to decision-making power. Overall, the 
state is seen to be pushed and pulled by lobbies and interest groups that are 
more interested in redistribution than overall economic growth in society. In 
this way, resources are directed from production to ‘rent-seeking’. 
2.3 Tariff  and  quota 
Now, suppose in Figure 1 that government imposes a tariff (t) per unit of im-
ports, e.g. on sugar, so that Pw rises to Pw + t. Then the units purchased will 
fall from Qw to Qw+t. By this, EU import is reduced to Qw+t – Qd+t units 
compared to Qw – Qd without any trade restrictions. In contrast, domestic units 
supplied will rise from Qd to Qd+t. Gains from trade shrink from areas A, B, C 
and D to A. The EU net loss from less free trade (dead-weight loss) amounts to 
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2  We do not consider income effects arising from changes in consumer surplus, which might 
change the producer surplus as well. the two triangles B and D since area C is the tariff revenue collected by the EU, 
i.e. t x (Qw+t – Qd+t). The ‘rent’ of area C is in this case collected by the EU. 
 
A quota system, e.g. for bananas, results in the same net loss for the EU. The 
quota of (Qw+t – Qd+t) limits EU imports and creates an excess demand at Pw. 
Therefore, Pw is bid up to Pw + t where supply equals domestic demand. This 
situation allows holders of import licences to purchase imports at the price Pw 
and resell them in the domestic market at the price Pw+t earning a rent of t x 
(Qw+t – Qd+t). This ‘rent’ of area C is equal to the tariff revenue and is now 
collected by the holders of import permits. Overall, we observe the same net 
loss in the quota system as found in the tariff system (triangles B and D) and the 
reduced area A gain from restricted free-trade (see Meier and Rauch, 2000). 
 
Once more, it is instructive to identify winners and losers. While the consumers 
lose consumer surplus as described above, the domestic producers experience 
an increase in producer surplus of size G, since they can increase their prices 
(due to reduced competition) and sell more. In this case, we get the opposite 
situation that although society as a whole is worse off; the producers still prefer 
this new situation (compared to the free trade situation). The overall lesson to 
be drawn from this example is that identifying winners and losers of a proposed 
regulation (or government intervention into market solution) will be important 
when such parties have lobbying power in order to fully understand the choice 
of regulation. 
 
Most importantly, the domestic suppliers are willing to invest up to the amount 
equal to area G to induce the domestic government to put the tariff, t, on im-
ports. Thus, we have a quantitative measure of the amount that suppliers are 
willing to use for lobby activities if such activity is expected to change the 




Just as firms will lobby for rents from keeping international competitors out of 
their domestic markets, so will they lobby to get rents from environmental regu-
lation. One way of achieving the latter could be to ask for environmental 
regulation where the rents from receiving permits for free exceed the lation where the rents from receiving permits for free exceed the environmental 
abatement costs added to the costs of lobbyism. The rent from regulation could 
either result from getting better market conditions compared to other actors (in-
cluding potential actors) in the market or by getting property rights over some 
parts of the environmental assets. In the latter case, the rent can be perceived as 
a payment for possessing a scarce input factor. The rent is net of the direct costs 
of regulation, but we will, in the next section, identify conditions under which 
the net benefit from regulation (rent minus cost of complying with the specified 
target) is positive, leaving a lot of room for even costly lobbying activities. 
 
The amount of lobbying activity is dependent on two different conditions, first 
the size of the ‘rent’ for the firms arising from different instruments and second, 
the likelihood of the success of such activities. In the next section, we show 
how these two conditions enter the choice of instruments to reduce pollution, 
and in particular, we turn to the case of a grandfathered permit market. 
3 Grandfathering 
3.1  Incumbent firms and regulation 
In this section we present a simple model that shows how a grandfathered per-
mit system affects the costs of incumbent firms and entrants. This enables us to 
draw important conclusions about the cost-difference between these two types 
of firms, the size of the rent and how the regulation influences the dynamics of 
the production market coming from entry and exit possibilities. 
 
If the industry is polluting, it will be subject to regulation. It is well known that 
(at least in a full information situation) an appropriate choice of either taxes or 
(tradable) quotas will bring about any level of pollution in a cost-efficient way.
3 
This result of cost-efficiency is achieved for any tradable permit system (TPS), 
no matter how the initial allocation of permits is designed, e.g. whether permits 
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3  In what follows we will neglect the possibilities of transaction costs, or other distortions in the 
permit market. are allocated by an auction or are grandfathered. So from an efficiency point of 
view, the instruments are equivalent. However, different instruments treat in-
cumbent and entrants unequally. While a pollution tax (or an auction) treats all 
firms equal, a grandfathered system is strongly beneficial to the incumbent 
firms. 
 
Using the insight gained in the previous section on the choice of regulatory in-
strument to control the CO2 emissions in the EU, we identify winners from dif-
ferent types of regulation and make an assessment of the prospective outcome 
from using lobbying activity to direct the regulation in a preferred way. We do 
not explicitly specify an objective function for the policy makers in charge of 
the final choice of regulatory instrument. Instead, we take the view that the pol-
icy outcome is (at least partly) determined by the lobby-activities of interest 
stakeholder groups, and in the case of EU-legislation, partly by the objective of 
the EU of free competition. Given this, an instrument that satisfies the follow-
ing criteria is a serious candidate for the final choice: a) minimizing the resis-
tance from important lobby-groups (by securing the environmental target (envi-
ronmental groups) at a minimum cost for the affected firms/ industries, and b) 
has no (or does minimize) the adverse impact on the output market that the 
regulated firms supply to. Specifically, we now show that a grandfathered per-
mit system satisfies all these criteria. 
3.2  The effect of a grandfathered system on the structure 
  of the industry 
In order to focus on our main points, we introduce a simple model. First of all, 
assume a perfectly competitive product market
4 Initially, no regulation exists. 
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In figure 2, MC
I(q) represents the incumbent firm’s marginal cost of producing 
a good, q, while AC
I(q) is the average production costs. P
m is the prevailing 
market price. In this figure a standard u-shaped cost structure and the resulting 
long run zero profit result is presented. The zero profit result occurs as a long 
run effect of entry.
5 
3.3  Introduction of regulation 
As a by-product of the production of output, pollution is generated, which en-
ters the ecosystems.
6 However, the regulating authorities wish to control this 
emission since it generates external costs, which are not appropriately ac-
counted for in the product price. The proposed regulatory instrument is a grand-
fathered TPS. Let us first investigate this grandfathered permit system without 
any entry considerations. In a grandfathered system, the property rights over the 
permits are handed over to the polluting firms for free. Together with this trans-
fer, the number of permits will have to be reduced over time in order to get a 
                                                            
5  A zero-profit equilibrium does not imply that it is not profitable to be in this industry, it means 
that all of the factors of productions are being paid their market price. A zero profit situation 
means that there will by no further profitable entry into this industry. 
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6  We exclusively look at uniformly mixed pollutants, such as CO2. reduction of pollution. This can be achieved in several ways. The simplest ap-
proach is to uniformly (in the sense of treating all incumbents equally with re-
spect of reduction targets) reduce the value (or the amount) of transferred per-
mits over time. As an example, each firm gets the property rights over (1-x) 
percent of its current emission level, where x is between 0 and 1. Hence, if 
x=0.2, then each firm gets the property rights over 80% of its current emission, 
implying a total reduction of 20% by the industry. For simplicity, we look at a 
situation where the reduction of permits is made instantaneously. 
 
When trading is permitted, incumbent firms with high marginal reduction costs 
(MRC
1) will buy permits, while firms with low marginal reduction costs will 
sell permits, until each firm’s marginal reduction costs are equalised, represent-
ing the cost-efficient allocation.
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In figure 3, we analyse a situation where all incumbent firms have been given 
free permit for 80 % of their pre-regulation pollution. MRC
I represents mar-
ginal reduction costs. The buying firm (the firm with high reduction costs) in-
curs a cost from regulation of area A, while the selling firm (the firm with low 
reduction costs) incurs a total cost regulation amounting to A-C. The permit 
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7  The reason why the firm with the high cost of reduction has survived in the fully competitive 




The possibility of entry is now introduced, and for simplicity we assume that 
this does not change the permit price.
8 We will now correct two misconceptions 
often made about the grandfathered permit system. The first is that a grand-
fathered system acts as a barrier to entry, and secondly that it reduces the dy-
namics in the product market by reducing the pressure from potential entrants. 
 
The grandfathered system does not establish a barrier to entry. To verify this 
claim, let us be more specific about what is meant by a barrier to entry. There 
exists no uniformly agreed upon definition of what establishes an entry barrier. 
However, in our case it has been argued that a grandfathered system yields a 
cost advantage to the incumbent firms. A natural candidate for an adequate 
definition is given by Bain (1956):
9 A barrier to entry exists where established 
sellers in an industry have an advantage over potential entrant sellers, where 
this advantage is reflected in the extent to which established sellers can persis-
tently raise their prices above the competitive level without attracting new firms 
to enter the industry. 
 
Although the incumbent firms have lower costs of production than potential en-
trants equipped with similar technology to the incumbents, the endowment of 
permits has an opportunity cost that adds to the incumbent firms’ costs as well 
(the firm is squandering the potential revenue from selling the permits). The 
free (grandfathered) permits represent a market value (the number of permits 
times the permit price). However, this value can only be realised by not using 
the permits (and selling them). If a firm uses its permits, it loses (foregoes) this 
opportunity. Hence, using the permit has an opportunity cost equal to the value 
of the endowment of the permits. As is well known from microeconomics, in 
                                                            
8  This assumption can be justified if entry is small or entrants will price out incumbents, or when 
entry is merely a threat if incumbents act inefficiently and profit opportunities exists. 
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9  See also Koustaal (1997). order to derive economic profit, all costs, including opportunity costs, must be 
included in the profit function.
10 
 
What are the long run consequences of this type of regulation? Assume that an 
incumbent firm has average costs of AC
I, and by subtracting opportunity costs 
of the endowment of permits gives AC
I-oc as in figure 4.
11 In the long run, the 
entrants can copy the technology of the incumbent firm, in which case it is ex-
pected that AC
I=AC
E in our fully competitive environment. This has as a long 
run consequence that the long run output price is pushed downward to P
m im-
plying zero profit for all market participants. Given the above definition of bar-
riers to entry, the incumbent firms cannot persistently raise prices above the 
competitive level (that is, P
m>AC
min), since this will attract entrants. 
 



































































































































































Another way to see that at P
m the incumbent firms operate with zero profit, is to 
consider what happens if a firm acts inefficiently. An inefficient incumbent will 
still be priced out by an efficient entrant. If an incumbent acts inefficiently, it 
will earn a negative profit at P=P
m. That is, stopping production and selling its 
stock of permits is a more profitable option than continuing production. Hence, 
any price above P=P
m will result in entry, and any price below P=P
m will result 
in incumbent firms leaving the industry. 
                                                            
10  See e.g. Varian (1999) chapter 19. 
 
18
11  The exact shape of this curve is not important; all that matters is that the AC
I-oc curve lies 
above the AC
I curve.  Hence, the grandfathered system neither establishes barrier to entry nor does it 
reduce the long run dynamics coming from entry. 
 
Although the incumbent firms operate under a zero profit constraint in the long 
run, they nevertheless receive a rent from regulation. The rent comes from hold-
ing a factor that is scarce, in this case the permits. The value of this holding is 
given by the area B in figure 4, which is equal to the market evaluation of the 
value of the endowment of permits that the incumbent holds. This rent has no 
implications regarding the profits and entry decision (since it is equal to the op-
portunity costs of the permits), but it still represents a value to the firm. (See 
Koustaal, 1997, for more examples of this type of rent). Although the incum-
bent firm operates under zero profit, as it did prior to the regulation, it still re-
ceives a rent due to regulation that it would not receive under a tax or auctioned 
system. Therefore, the incumbent firm obviously prefers the grandfathered sys-
tem. The rent is a form of payment, or redistribution from the regulator to the 
incumbent firms and can be thought of as political costs to make regulation fea-
sible. As the example in section 2 with the agricultural support systems in EU 
demonstrated, the incumbent firms are willing to use part of these resources in 
lobby activities either to convince policy makers that this system is the best, or 
once the regulation is in place, to keep this type of regulation. 
 
An important result emerges from comparing figures 3 and 4: Situations exist 
where the rent from regulation with grandfathered permits exceeds the cost to 
the firms of this regulation. This is the case when A>B for a buying firm and A-
C>B for a selling firm. When is this situation most likely? One situation is 
when pollution is an inevitable by-product to production, which is often the 
case when considering CO2-emissions. In this case the grandfathered permits 
represents a high value. In such a case we cannot exclude the possibility of the 
unexpected result that introducing regulation actually improves the net position 
of an incumbent firm and here the firm definitely has an incentive to use some 
of its resources for lobbying activities in order to influence the regulation.
12 
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12  Of course, such calculation should also include costs of lobbying. The industry prefers the grandfathered tradable permit system, since it yields a 
rent to the incumbent firms, which the other types of regulation do not. Thus, 
the rent seeking motives of the firms should result in lobby-activities aimed at 
influencing policy decisions if it is likely that such activity will influence deci-
sions in a preferred direction. On the other and, we do not, from a theoretical 
point of view, find any significant reasons to expect strong resistance from pol-
icy makers against this system, since it guarantees the environmental target, 
yields long-run dynamic efficiency, and consequently, not higher commodity 
prices compared to an auctioned system. In one respect, however, the system 
with auctions is superior to a grandfathered system. In case when the payments 
collected from auctions are used to reduce distorting taxes. This however, af-
fects all taxpayers, who are not organised and are not likely to lobby against 
this type of regulation. 
 
Thus, we consider the grandfathered system to be a feasible compromise be-
tween economic efficiency and political feasibility. 
4.  The case of GHG trade in the EU 
4.1  Green Paper and final directive proposal 
The Green Paper on GHG trade in the EU contains ten questions for discussion 
and these can again be divided into four main groups. The first four questions 
concern the target group. Questions 5 and 6 are about allocation rule concern-
ing permits, i.e. the focus of this paper. Questions 7 and 8 address emissions 
trading and the potential mix of the permit system with other instruments. Fi-
nally, questions 9 and 10 cover the compliance issue. 
 
On the second issue of allocation, the Green Paper lists a number of possibili-
ties such as auctioning-off permits to the highest bidding parties. The auction 
mechanism suggested by the Commission would clearly eliminate rent-
seeking, as existing firms would have to pay for all the permits they acquire just 
as new firms would have to do. Still, the optimal solution of auctioning-off the 
 
20permits is not politically feasible because the final choice in the directive pro-
posal is an allocation rule free of charge in the form of grandfathering. 
 
The grandfathering system is to be based on benchmarking or a historic base-
line, which is clearly the solution that benefits rent-seeking industry the most 
(as argued in Sections 2 and 3 above). Exactly the same choice of allocation 
rule can be observed in all US tradable permit systems where grandfathering 
was chosen, see Tietenberg 1985; Svendsen 1998; Daugbjerg and Svendsen 
2001). 
 
The purpose of the following analysis is to state whether, according to their an-
swers given to questions at the Green Paper hearing, a sector is a winner or a 
loser regarding the final choice of allocation rule. Here, we define ‘winners’ as 
actors who influence the market design in their favour, thus achieving a net gain 
from rent-seeking. This approach is in line with the theoretical framework of 
Tullock (1967) and Olson (1965). 
 
Thus, we look for the answer to the following question: if there is to be regula-
tion, will industry prefer grandfathered GHG emission trading or something 
else? We deal with the six main industrial groups, namely electricity producers, 
refining sector, iron and steel, paper and pulp, building materials, and chemical 
industry. The stated preferences are all found in the Green Paper hearing replies 
(DG Environment, 2000). When we refer to the preference of a political actor in 
the following, this Green Paper hearing is the source. If another source is cited, 
this source will be explicitly listed. The following section 4.2 relies heavily on 
Markussen et al. (2002). 
4.2 Industrial  interest  groups 
EU electricity producers are the main emitters of CO2 and are their participation 
is therefore crucial to the liquidity and environmental success of the permit 
market. The opinion of these large electricity producers is mainly represented 
by EURELECTRIC. A main concern of EURELECTRIC is that the electricity 
 
21sector will be required to reduce emissions much more than other sectors. 
EURELECTRIC also states that with respect to CO2 emissions, the electricity 
sector should be recognised by the Commission and by politicians as a sector 
that has already done a lot, and in the long term, electricity offers the possibility 
of minimal emissions. In its hearing reply, EURELECTRIC clearly states that it 
wants GHG trade and that the best method of allocation is grandfathering based 
on historical emissions and not any type of auction. In conclusion, the large 
electricity producers won on the grandfathering allocation rule. 
 
The oil and gas industry is represented by the International Association of Gas 
and Oil Producers (OGP). The daughter organisation, EUROPIA, represents the 
refineries and is the author of their Green Paper hearing reply. Clearly, given 
the ‘right’ implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the gas industry envisages a 
booming market because the carbon intensity of gas is about half the intensity 
of coal. Consequently, an increased share of natural gas use in the energy sector 
will be needed to support the Kyoto targets. In this respect, the gas lobby is al-
most like an abatement lobby. The position of the gas sector is identical to that 
of electricity producers, namely they prefer GHG trade and grandfathering as 
the allocation rule. 
 
The European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries (EUROFER) repre-
sents 96% of the iron and steel industries in Europe. Therefore, the answers 
from EUROFER are used to describe the attitudes to emissions trading in the 
steel industry. Steel and iron production is energy intensive and ways to in-
crease productivity and reduce the use of energy are the same as reducing costs. 
Thus, the EUROFER asks for grandfathered emission trading rather than tradi-
tional standard regulation under the condition that allocation must take early 
actions and voluntary agreements into account. 
 
The Confederation of European Paper Industry (CEPI) represents the pulp and 
paper industry in Europe. The position of CEPI is also supported by the Con-
federation of European Forrest Owners, CEPF. The sector wanted a voluntary 
system, where targets are set by negotiation and compliance should be on a 
 
22community level. The allocation rule should be based on common guidelines at 
the EU-level through grandfathering based on a common baseline. In conclu-
sion, the pulp and paper industry has partly lost because they did not get a vol-
untary system – still, they are winners in the sense that the suggested mandatory 
system includes grandfathering as the allocation rule. 
 
The cement industry is represented by CEMBUREAU and the ceramic industry 
by CERAMIE-UNIE. The answers from the ceramic sector are not very de-
tailed and are, to a large extent, similar to the cement industry’s answers. Over-
all, they are in favour of an early but voluntary start of the programme in 2005. 
The same sectors and companies should be covered in all member states. In or-
der to avoid distortions to competition, a co-ordinated framework at the EU-
level is needed and this could be done by grandfathered emission trading. Auc-
tioning is not favourable because it is tantamount to a tax, though the ceramic 
industry is in favour of auctioning. 
 
The European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) is the umbrella organisation 
for the national chemical federations and chemical companies in Europe. It 
represents more than 40,000 companies and has a net turnover of €40 billion. 
The chemical sector lobby does not want to be a part of an EU program. The 
industry emphasizes that permit trading will constrain their competitiveness and 
their ability to grow. The sector has already improved its efficiency through a 
Voluntary Energy Efficiency programme and further end-of-pipe abatement is 
not economically feasible. The chemical industry can be said to have won, as 
they are not a part of the final proposal and are regulated by national and volun-
tary targets. Furthermore, because the number of producers is very large and 
because they do emit all 6 GHGs in complicated processes, it is probably too 




The theory outlined in this paper strongly suggests that the incumbent firms 
prefer a grandfathered permit system to other types of regulation. While this 
conclusion might not come as a surprise, the reason for it is most interesting. 
The analysis has shown that the grandfathered permit system does not yield a 
cost-advantage to the incumbent firms compared to (potential) entrants, how-
ever, it yields a rent to incumbent firms equal to the market evaluation of the 
value of the initial endowment of the permits. Thus, the lobbying for a specific 
type of regulation is triggered by rent seeking motives. We find that such lobby-
ing activity is likely to be successful since the grandfathered permit system does 
not imply any reduced competition in the product market. This is so, because 
the grandfathered permit system does not yield any barriers to entry and does 
not reduce the pressure coming from potential profit seeking entrants thus still 
inducing the incumbent firms to act efficiently in the product market. 
 
Turning to the empirical side, our ‘first-round’ observation was that the chemi-
cal sector won by avoiding becoming a part of the final program and thereby 
facing the extra cost of having to undertake abatement efforts. However, the 
reason for excluding the chemical sector was administrative rather than politi-
cal. It did not pay to monitor and control the chemical sector for administrative 
reasons because of its many small producers and the fact that they generally 
emitted all 6 GHGs, see Markussen et al. (2002). 
 
However, the other five industrial groups listed in the Green Paper, were gener-
ally and overwhelmingly in favour of emission trading and grandfathering as 
the allocation rule. This could be a plausible explanation why grandfathering 
was chosen among a number of permit allocation rules, most prominently the 
auction solution. Grandfathering favoured industry in general as it minimizes 
private emissions reduction costs and creates, as we showed in Section 2, a rent 
to existing firms. Thus, this feature of the design in the proposal directive points 
in particular to the presence of powerful industrial rent seeking. A similar result 
 
24can be found in the US, where all tradable permit systems use grandfathering as 
the permit allocation rule, see Svendsen (1998). 
 
The electricity sector is the largest and most important sector for the implemen-
tation of the programme and the directive did, therefore, support their interests. 
The electricity sector has, as shown by Varming et al. (2000), numerous and 
cheap options for CO2 reduction compared to other industrial sectors that use 
fossil fuels for energy production. This argument is illustrated by the fact that 
industrial representatives such as UNICE and DG Enterprise were most active 
in lobbying against the final directive proposal, which for this reason, was sig-
nificantly delayed (ENDS, 2001a-b). Because this sector in particular has ac-
cess to cheap technical possibilities generally, it may turn out to be an overall 
potential seller of permits so that its emissions reduction costs and lobbying 
costs in total are lower than the rent and potential trade gains it will face. 
 
In conclusion, the grandfathered permit system to be used in the EU, establishes 
a sound political compromise since it on the one hand generates a rent for estab-
lished firms (the one bearing the main costs of regulation) and on the other hand 
provides a system that copes with one of the main pillars of the EU, to establish 
and maintain competition in the product markets without jeopardizing the speci-
fied environmental target levels. 
 
25References 
[1]  Bain, J (1956), Barriers to New Competition, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
[2]  Brandt, U.S. and Svendsen, G.T. (2002): ‘Hot Air in Kyoto, Cold Air in 
The Hague’, Energy Policy. In press. 
 
[3]  Buchanan, J.M. and Tullock, G. (1962), The Calculus of Consent, Ann Ar-
bor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
[4] CEU  (2000):  Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the 
European Union. Commission of the European Community, Brussels, 
8.3.2000, COM (2000) 87 final. 
 
[5] CEU  (2001):  Directive establishing a framework for greenhouse gas emis-
sions trading within the European Union, Commission of the European 
Community, (COM(2001)581). 
 
[6]  Cropper, M.L. and Oates, W.E. (1992), ‘Environmental Economics: A Sur-
vey’, Journal of Economic Literature, XXX, 675–740. 
 
[7]  Daugbjerg, C. and Svendsen, G.T. (2001): Green Taxation in Question. 
UK: MacMillan (Palgrave). 
 
[8]  Dijkstra, B.R. (1999), The Political Economy of Environmental Policy. 
New Horizons in Environmental Economics. UK: Edward Elgar, Chelten-
ham. 
 
[9]  DG Environment (2000): Answers to Green Paper from national govern-




26[10] ENDS  (2001a):  EU Emission Trading Scheme Proposal Delayed 
(29/6/01), ENDS Environment Daily News. www.environmentaldaily.com 
 
[11] ENDS (2001b): EU climate policy package delayed (17/10/01), ENDS En-
vironment Daily News. www.environmentaldaily.com 
 
[12] Fishback, P., Libecap, G., and Zajac, E. (2000), Public Choice Essays in 
Honor of a Maverick Scholar: Gordon Tullock, Dordrecht: Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers. 
 
[13] Hahn, R.W. and Stavins, R.N. (1992), ‘Economic Incentives for Environ-
mental Protection: Integrating Theory and Practice’, American Economic 
Review, 82, 464–8. 
 
[14] Koustaal, P. (1997), Economic Policy and Climate Change, Tradable Per-
mits for Reducing Carbon Emissions, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
[15] Markussen, P., Svendsen, G.T. and Vesterdal, M. (2002): ‘The Political 
Economy of a Tradable GHG Permit Market in the European Union.’ De-
partment of Economics, Aarhus School of Business, Working Paper 02-3. 
 
[16] McKenzie, R. and Tullock, G. (1981), The New World of Economics: Ex-
plorations into the Human Experience. Homewood Ill.: R.D. Irwin. 
 
[17] Meier, G.M. and Rauch, J.E. (2000): Leading Issues in Economic Devel-
opment. 7
th Edition. Oxford University Press, New York. 
 
[18] Mueller, D.C. (1989), Public Choice II, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 




27[20]  Svendsen, G.T. (1998): Public Choice and Environmental Regulation: 
Tradable Permit Systems in United States and CO2 Taxation in Europe. 
New Horizons in Environmental Economics, Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar. 
 
[21] Svendsen, G.T. (1999): ‘US Interest Groups Prefer Emission Trading: A 
New Perspective.’ Public Choice, Vol. 101, 109-28.  
 
[22] Svendsen, G.T. (2003): Political Economy of the European Union: Institu-
tions, Policy and Economic Growth. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. In 
press. 
 
[23]  Svendsen, G.T. and Christensen, J.L. (1999): ‘The US SO2 Auction: 
Analysis and generalisation.’ Energy Economics, 21/5, 403-416. 
 
[24]  Tietenberg, T.H. (1985): Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming 
Pollution Policy. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. 
 
[25] Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. 
Western Economic Journal, 5, 224–32. 
 
[26] Varian, H.R. (1999): Intermediate microeconomics: A modern approach. 
W.W. Norton & Company. New York. 
 
[27] Varming, S.; Eriksen, P. B.; Grohnheit, P. E.; Nielsen, L.; Svendsen, G. T.; 
Vesterdal, M. (2000), CO2 permits in Danish and European energy policy. 
Risø. R-1184 (EN). Risø National Laboratory, Roskilde, 
 www.risoe.dk/rispubl/SYS/ris-r-1184.htm. 
 
[28] Wallart, N. (1999), The Political Economy of Environmental Taxes. New 
Horizons in Environmental Economics. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 
 
28Department of Environmental and Business Economics 
Institut for Miljø- og Erhvervsøkonomi (IME) 
 
 





Issued working papers from IME 
Udgivne arbejdspapirer fra IME 
No.    
1/99  Frank Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Hans Frost 
Asymmetrisk information og regulering 
af forurening 
2/99 Finn  Olesen  Monetær integration i EU 
3/99 Frank  Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Regulation of Renewable Resources in 
Federal Systems: The Case of Fishery in 
the EU 
4/99 Villy  Søgaard  The Development of Organic Farming in 
Europe 
5/99 Teit  Lüthje 
Finn Olesen 
EU som handelsskabende faktor? 
6/99  Carsten Lynge Jen-
sen 
A Critical Review of the Common Fish-
eries Policy 
7/00  Carsten Lynge Jen-
sen 
Output Substitution in a Regulated Fish-
ery 
8/00 Finn  Olesen  Jørgen Henrik Gelting – En betydende 
dansk keynesianer 
9/00 Frank  Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries 
Regulation: The Case of Illegal Land-
ings 
10/00 Finn  Olesen  Moral, etik og økonomi 
11/00 Birgit  Nahrstedt  Legal Aspect of Border Commuting in 
the Danish-German Border Region 
12/00 Finn  Olesen  Om Økonomi, matematik og videnskabe-
lighed - et bud på provokation 
 
 
2913/00  Finn Olesen 
Jørgen Drud Hansen 
European Integration: Some stylised 
facts 
14/01  Lone Grønbæk  Fishery Economics and Game Theory 
15/01  Finn Olesen  Jørgen Pedersen on fiscal policy - A note 
16/01  Frank Jensen  A Critical Review of the Fisheries Pol-
icy: Total Allowable Catches and Ra-
tions for Cod in the North Sea 
17/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Are uniform solutions focal? The case of 
international environmental agreements 
18/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Group Uniform Solutions 
19/01  Frank Jensen  Prices versus Quantities for Common 
Pool Resources 
20/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Uniform Reductions are not that Bad 
21/01  Finn Olesen 
Frank Jensen 
A note on Marx 
22/01  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard 
Svendsen 
Hot air in Kyoto, cold air in The Hague 
23/01  Finn Olesen  Den marginalistiske revolution: En 
dansk spire der ikke slog rod? 
24/01  Tommy Poulsen  Skattekonkurrence og EU's skatte-
struktur 
25/01  Knud Sinding  Environmental Management Systems as 
Sources of Competitive Advantage 
26/01  Finn Olesen  On Machinery. Tog Ricardo fejl? 
27/01  Finn Olesen  Ernst Brandes: Samfundsspørgsmaal - 
en kritik af Malthus og Ricardo 
28/01  Henrik Herlau 
Helge Tetzschner 
Securing Knowledge Assets in the Early 
Phase of Innovation 
29/02  Finn Olesen  Økonomisk teorihistorie 
Overflødig information eller brugbar 
ballast? 
 
30/02  Finn Olesen  Om god økonomisk metode 
– beskrivelse af et lukket eller et åbent 
socialt system? 
31/02  Lone Grønbæk 
Kronbak 
The Dynamics of an Open Access: The 
case of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery - A 
Strategic Approach - 
 





Technical Efficiency of the Danish Trawl 
fleet: Are the Industrial Vessels Better 
Than Others? 
 




Estimation of Production Functions on 
Fishery: A Danish Survey 
34/02  Hans Jørgen Skriver  Organisationskulturens betydning for 
vidensdelingen mellem daginstitutions-
ledere i Varde Kommune 
35/02  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard 
Svendsen 
Rent-seeking and grandfathering: The 
case of GHG trade in the EU 
 
 
 
31